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Abstract
Background: In accordance with the Theory of Structural Dissociation of the Personality (TSDP), studies of dissociative
identity disorder (DID) have documented that two prototypical dissociative subsystems of the personality, the ‘‘Emotional
Part’’ (EP) and the ‘‘Apparently Normal Part’’ (ANP), have different biopsychosocial reactions to supraliminal and subliminal
trauma-related cues and that these reactions cannot be mimicked by fantasy prone healthy controls nor by actors.
Methods: Arterial spin labeling perfusion MRI was used to test the hypotheses that ANP and EP in DID have different
perfusion patterns in response to rest instructions, and that perfusion is different in actors who were instructed to simulate
ANP and EP. In a follow-up study, regional cerebral blood flow of DID patients was compared with the activation pattern of
healthy non-simulating controls.
Results: Compared to EP, ANP showed elevated perfusion in bilateral thalamus. Compared to ANP, EP had increased
perfusion in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, primary somatosensory cortex, and motor-related areas. Perfusion patterns
for simulated ANP and EP were different. Fitting their reported role-play strategies, the actors activated brain structures
involved in visual mental imagery and empathizing feelings. The follow-up study demonstrated elevated perfusion in the
left temporal lobe in DID patients, whereas non-simulating healthy controls had increased activity in areas which mediate
the mental construction of past and future episodic events.
Conclusion: DID involves dissociative part-dependent resting-state differences. Compared to ANP, EP activated brain
structures involved in self-referencing and sensorimotor actions more. Actors had different perfusion patterns compared to
genuine ANP and EP. Comparisons of neural activity for individuals with DID and non-DID simulating controls suggest that
the resting-state features of ANP and EP in DID are not due to imagination. The findings are consistent with TSDP and
inconsistent with the idea that DID is caused by suggestion, fantasy proneness, and role-playing.
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Introduction
Consistent clinical observations and retrospective findings
indicate that dissociative identity disorder (DID) [1] is intimately
related to severe traumatization, including emotional neglect [2].
This conclusion is supported by the results of prospective
longitudinal research of dissociation [3,4,5]. Whereas most
theories of DID include traumatization as one of the causal
factors of the disorder [6], the sociocognitive model of DID
involves the idea that the disorder is caused by suggestion, fantasy
proneness, and role-playing [7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. However, studies
showing that DID can be caused by these factors is lacking, and
patients with DID are not particularly fantasy prone [14]. Also,
mentally healthy women [15], high and low fantasy prone women
[14], and actors [16] motivated and instructed to simulate two
different prototypes of dissociative parts were unable to simulate
the psychophysiological and neural activation patterns of these
dissociative parts in women with DID.
Socioculture contexts affect any mental disorder [2], including
dissociative disorders. However, there are no studies with DID
patients showing that true positive cases are manufactured during
(suggestive) psychotherapy, and that these patients’ memories of
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childhood abuse are generally due to suggestion. Studies with DID
patients have in fact disconfirmed the idea that the disorder results
from the causes that the sociocognitive model of DID proposes
[14,15,16]. For a discussion of this subject see Sar et al.: [17].
Several studies have compared psychobiological reactions of
different dissociative parts in DID, but advances in the field
critically depend on theoretical predictions with respect to the kind
of biopsychosocial differences that exist among different types of
dissociative subsystems or ‘‘parts’’ of the personality as a whole
biopsychosocial system [18]. The Theory of Structural Dissocia-
tion of the Personality (TSDP) offers such hypotheses [2,19,20].
The two major prototypes of dissociative parts that TSDP
distinguishes are metaphorically referred to as ‘‘Emotional Parts‘‘
(EP) and ‘‘Apparently Normal Parts‘‘ (ANP). As ANP, DID
patients aim to fulfill functions in daily life, and in this context they
try to mentally and behaviorally avoid traumatic memories and
other trauma-related stimuli, commonly including EP. ANP, thus,
has not or not sufficiently personified traumatic experiences and
memories, can have a degree of amnesia regarding the traumatic
past, and is to some degree depersonalized and bodily numbed. As
EP, DID patients are fixated in traumatic memories, that is, in
non-integrated sensorimotor and emotional reenactments of
traumatizing events. There are two major subtypes of EP [19].
One subtype tends to engage in active mammalian defenses (e.g.,
freezing, flight, attachment cry) and strong emotions, such as
intense fear, in reaction to actual or perceived threat. These
reactions involve dominance of the sympathetic nervous system.
As this subtype, DID patients are generally self-conscious,
emotional (e.g., fearful), body-oriented, and hyperaroused. The
other subtype of EP predominantly engages in passive mammalian
defense (death feigning, also described as tonic immobility) to
actual or perceived threat. This kind of defense would imply a
degree of parasympathetically mediated hypoarousal, emotional
numbing, and bodily anesthesia. Phenomenologically, ANP is
predominantly characterized by dissociative symptoms that can be
categorized as negative dissociative symptoms (functional losses),
and EP (subtype active defense) by positive dissociative symptoms
(e.g., re-enactments of traumatic experiences). Patients with DID
commonly include more than one ANP and more than one EP.
Some of their dissociative parts involve mixed features of ANP and
EP.
TSDP is supported by clinical and empirical evidence. For
example, in a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study, DID
patients listened as ANP and as EP (subtype active defense) to
audiotaped descriptions of a neutral autobiographical memory
that these dissociative parts had in common, as well as to a
description of a traumatic memory that was only autobiographical
for EP [21,22]. ANP and EP (in Reinders et al. (2006) referred to
as neutral identity state (NIS) and trauma-related identity state
(TIS), respectively) had different psychophysiological and neural
reaction patterns to the trauma script. In line with TSDP, as ANP,
the patients had a brain activation pattern similar to patients with
depersonalization disorder [23] and PTSD patients with negative
dissociative symptoms to trauma-related stimuli [24,25] (i.e.,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), somatosensory association area).
ANP had highly similar reaction patterns to the neutral and the
trauma script, which also indicates low emotional involvement in
the trauma script. As EP (subtype active defense), patients were
deeply emotionally and bodily engaged in this script. In contrast
with ANP, EP had activation in many brain areas (i.e., insular
cortex, amygdala, basal ganglia, cerebellum) also observed in
PTSD patients who were confronted with a personalized trauma
script and who reacted with positive symptoms such as subjective
and physiological hyperarousal [26,27,28]. As EP but not as ANP,
DID patients showed a significant increase in heart rate and blood
pressure and a significant decrease in heart rate variability in
reaction to the trauma script. In sum, EP was psychobiologically
hyperaroused, and ANP was underengaged. The same paradigm
was repeated with healthy matched controls [14]. Neither high nor
low fantasy prone, mentally healthy women instructed and
motivated to simulate ANP and EP had the psychophysiological
and neural activation patterns of the genuine ANP and EP in DID
patients. This finding contradicts the sociocognitive model of DID
[7,8,9,11,13,29].
With main effect and conjunction analyses [30,31], Reinders et
al. (2006) demonstrated that ANP and EP were associated with
two different neural networks that are independent of the type of
the memory script they listened to. The authors suggested that
these networks might be involved in functioning as two different
prototypes of dissociative parts. If this idea holds, ANP and EP
should have different neural characteristics when instructed to rest,
that is, to relax, close their eyes, and lay immobile on the back in
the narrow enclosed MRI space with their head fixed, and without
the distraction of a more specific task. According to TSDP, this
assignment is emotionally challenging for DID patients most of
whom have been chronically abused and emotionally neglected.
The situation would be particularly demanding for them as EP.
The experimental procedure could trigger trauma-related mem-
ories on which EP is fixated, and that ANP attempts to avoid.
The study of resting-state neural activity has recently become an
important area of neuroimaging. Of special interest is the so called
default mode network (DMN), a set of brain areas consisting of the
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate (PCC) in
addition to midline parietal structures, lateral parietal regions, and
medial and lateral temporal lobes [32,33,34]. The DMN is
activated in response to rest instructions and is deactivated during
the execution of goal-directed tasks [35,36,37,38,39,40,41].
Converging evidence suggests that the DMN is critical for general
self-referential actions, such as autobiographical memory, self-
reflection, self-awareness (i.e. introspection), and stimulus-inde-
pendent thought [42,43,44,45].
The main goal of the current study was to examine and
compare brain perfusion patterns for ANP and EP (subtype active
defense) in DID patients following rest instructions. Rest
instructions, that is, instructions to relax and close the eyes, do
not imply that the participants are actually resting. The term
resting-state thus merely refers to the state that rest instructions
elicit.
No study to date investigated so called resting-state perfusion
differences in ANP and EP in DID. However, a Single-Photon
Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) study yielded bilateral
orbitofrontal hypoperfusion and left lateral hyperperfusion during
rest for a type of dissociative part in DID described as the ‘‘host’’
compared to healthy volunteers [46]. No significant perfusion
differences were observed between the host, defined as the
dissociative part of the personality that is most of the time present
during a usual day [47], and an ‘‘alter’’, a different type of
dissociative part. We suspect that in most cases, the ‘‘host’’ was an
ANP, but it is unclear if the ‘‘alter’’ involved a second ANP, an EP
prone to engage in active or passive mammallian defense, or an
ANP/EP mixture. If the ‘‘host’’ and the ‘‘alter’’ involved two
ANPs rather than an ANP and an EP (subtype active defense), this
might explain why Sar et al. [46] did not find different patterns of
brain activity for the tested dissociative parts. A different but not
incompatible possibility is that SPECT is insufficiently sensitive to
measure perfusion differences in response to rest instructions. In
the current study, we used more sensitive arterial spin labeling
(ASL), which generates PET-like images without the need of a
Resting-State Activity in Dissociative Identity Disorder
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98795
radioactive tracer [48]. ASL provides a quantitative CBF
measurement, and is therefore particularly useful in the investi-
gation of individual differences in brain metabolism [49].
In addition to the comparison of brain perfusion patterns for
ANP and EP in DID patients, the current study also investigated
neural activation patterns for ANP and EP in healthy simulating
controls (SIM) in order to test the idea that DID involves
suggestion and role-playing rather than a trauma-related condition
[9,29]. According to TSDP, simulating an ANP and EP and being
a genuine ANP and EP constitute different mental states. It can be
expected that in contrast to DID simulating controls, DID patients
engage as ANP and EP in self-referential actions following rest
instructions.
Considerations based on TSDP and the mentioned empirical
foundation lead us to hypothesize that (i) there are perfusion
differences for DID patients and DID simulating controls. In
particular, we predicted that (ia) compared to the actors, DID
patients show relatively higher activation in areas which
commonly exhibit increased neural activity following rest instruc-
tions (default mode activity), i.e. MPFC, PCC/precuneus, medial
and lateral parietal areas, and medial and lateral temporal regions.
Looking at the comparison from the other side, we hypothesized
that (ib) actors compared to DID patients elicit less default mode
activity because simulating an ANP and EP involves a goal-
directed task. We furthermore hypothesized that in response to the
described rest instructions, (ii) ANP and EP in DID have different
patterns of brain perfusion and that (iii) comparisons of ANP and
EP simulating controls yield different neural reactivity patterns
than comparisons of ANP and EP in DID patients.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen female DID patients were included in the current study,
which was part of a larger study in DID patients and DID
simulating controls [16]. We enrolled Swiss and German patients,
who were recruited from private practitioners of psychiatry and
psychotherapy and psychiatric outpatient departments. All partic-
ipants fulfilled the diagnostic criteria of DID according to DSM-IV
[1]. For the sake of the study, the clinical diagnoses were
independently checked by experts in dissociative disorders using
the German version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D) [50], the (SKID-D) [51]. The
therapy of the participating patients had to have progressed to a
treatment phase involving integration-focused exposure to trau-
matic memories [2,52]. Exclusion criteria were comorbid psycho-
sis, drug abuse or addiction, antisocial or histrionic personality
disorder, and a neurological or organic brain disease. Thirteen
patients were medicated at the time of the measurement,
predominantly with antidepressant medication. Two patients were
free of medication.
The DID simulating control group (SIM) consisted of 15 female
actors, who were instructed and motivated to simulate ANP and
EP during the resting-state experiment. They were carefully
informed about the characteristics of ANP and EP using written
information on TSDP. They also watched a video showing a DID
patient, who alternates between ANP and EP. The actors were
instructed to create an ANP and EP using a list of properties (e.g.,
name, sex, age). Of particular importance was that ANP should be
a dissociative part without personalized memories of traumatizing
events and EP a dissociative part with personalized traumatic
memories. The actors were requested to practice simulating ANP
and EP as often as they deemed necessary to effectively simulate
ANP and EP, but at least three times before the MRI
measurement.
There were no significant differences between the DID and
SIM group in age (DID: M=43.3 years, SD=9.1; SIM: M=43.2
years, SD=10.4; t(28) = 0.019, p.0.05) and educational level
(DID: M=4.1, SD=1.5; SIM: M=4.7, SD=1.2; t(26.099) =2
1.341, p.0.05; the educational level was assessed by a 7-point
Likert scale based on the common European educational system).
To ensure that none of the actors had a PTSD and/or major
depression, the controls completed the German version of the
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) [53] and the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory II (BDI-II) [54].
Each subject was informed about risks and inconveniences
associated with the experiment. All subjects gave written informed
consent. The local ethics committee (cantonal ethical commission
of Zurich) approved the study in compliance with the Helsinki
Declaration.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The subjects were instructed to relax with their eyes closed and
to stay motionless during the fMRI measurement (e.g., [34]). All
participants of the DID and SIM group were first tested as ANP
and next as EP, because starting with the less anxious dissociative
part might be less demanding for DID patients. The switch
between the different dissociative parts of the personality took
place outside the scanner, if needed with minimal guidance from
the research clinician. Because each dissociative part includes his/
her own conception of self [55], and because the participating
patients had developed the ability in treatment to switch on
request between the participating ANP and EP, it was possible to
ask these dissociative parts to ‘‘come forward’’ or ‘‘step back’’
during the experiment. For example, when the EP was to be
tested, addressing this part by her name, she was invited to ‘‘come
forward’’. If she had brought a personal object with her (e.g., a
cuddle toy), the patient was asked to hold this object in her hands
to support the switching process. Meanwhile, addressing the ANP
by her name, she was asked to ‘‘step back’’. To check for
inadvertent switches to and co-activation of one or more different
dissociative part than the intended ANP or EP, we asked the
participants after each run what part had been present during the
measurement. One ANP and two EP runs had to be repeated due
to a switch to and/or a co-activation of an unintended dissociative
part.
Image Acquisition and Data Preprocessing
The data of the DID and SIM group were obtained at the
University Hospital of Zurich with a 3-T Philips Achieva whole-
body magnetic resonance imaging equipped with an eight-channel
Philips SENSE head coil. Resting regional cerebral perfusion
(rCBF) images were acquired with a pseudo-continuous ASL (p-
CASL) sequence with background suppression (saturation of the
imaging slice preceding the labeling and inversion pulses 1680 ms
and 2760 ms after the saturation pulse) and a single shot echo-
planar imaging (EPI) readout (TR/TE=4180/12 ms, SENSE
factor 2.5) [56]. The duration of the labeling was 1650 ms and the
image was acquired after a delay of 1525 ms. The sequence
consisted of 23 slices of 6 mm slice thickness acquired in ascending
order with a 363 mm2 in-plane resolution. During a single run, 35
pairs of control/label image volumes were measured over a total
scan time of 5 minutes. An additional M0 image was acquired for
measurement of the magnetization of arterial blood (same
sequence as ASL without labeling or background suppression,
TR=10 s). A 3D MPRAGE T1-weighted anatomical scan was
acquired for anatomical reference and post-processing.
Resting-State Activity in Dissociative Identity Disorder
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The data of three actors and one patient were excluded due to
huge movement artefacts and low signal quality. One patient had
fallen asleep during the ANP and had switched several times
during the EP run. One patient was not able to undergo the MRI
measurement, and the data of one patient were lost due to a
storage failure at the MRI center. The final brain imaging
statistical analysis was performed with data of 11 participants in
the DID group and 12 in the SIM group.
Resting-state rCBF maps were calculated using in-house
programmed MATLAB scripts performing a simple pair-wise
subtraction of control and label images [56]. Further analyses were
performed with the statistical parametric mapping software SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). rCBF maps were normalized
to the EPI template [57], which transformed them into MNI space
(new voxel size = 26262 mm3). The normalized rCBF maps were
spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full width at half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
The preprocessed data were analyzed using a flexible factorial
design that consisted of two independent variables resulting in a
262 ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor:
Group (two levels: DID/SIM), Type of dissociative part of the
personality (two levels: ANP/EP). The second factor will be
referred to as Type in the rest of the article. In order to correct for
biological variation in total cerebral blood flow, the mean gray
matter (GM) CBF was included in the analysis as a covariate of no
interest. The mean GM signal per subject was calculated over a
GM mask obtained from the segmentation of the 3D T1 image by
thresholding the GM probability images at 0.5. Only the GM
signal was taken into account, as a previous study revealed that
GM perfusion showed most variability between sessions [58].
We performed a whole-brain voxel-wise analysis. The study
design allows the calculation of various effects, i.e. main effect of
Group, main effect of Type, and interaction effect Group by Type.
An uncorrected statistical threshold (i.e., voxel level of significance
uncorrected (unc.) for multiple testing) of p,0.005 was set for the
main effects and interaction effect. The minimum cluster-size was
set at 10 voxels.
Our main hypotheses were tested using one-sided t-tests. The
participants were measured as ANP and EP in the patient group
(DIDanp/DIDep) and in the control group (SIManp/SIMep).
Group differences between the patients (DID) and actors (SIM)
were assessed with a two-sample t-test based on the mean
perfusion map of ANP and EP of every single participant (DID-
SIM). Two planned comparisons consisting of Type effects
between groups (DIDanp-SIManp; DIDep-SIMep) and two
planned comparisons consisting of Type effects within groups
(DIDanp-DIDep; SIManp-SIMep) were performed. All five t-tests
were one-sided, thus were performed twice to assess positive rCBF
differences in one and in the inverse contrast. To keep statistical
thresholding of a priori defined regions conservative enough, we
used a Bonferroni correction for these subsequent tests (p,0.005/
5=p,0.001). Thus, all t-tests were fixed to a p,0.005 and
corrected for the number of tests. A similar approach has been
used in Schlumpf et al. (2013).
An explicit binary mask provided by FSL (http://www.fmrib.
ox.ac.uk/fsl) was applied at the level of the statistical interference
to remove extracranial voxels. The mask was normalized to MNI
space and had the same dimension and voxel size as the rCBF
maps. Only the most significant finding of a brain area and first
peak of a cluster are reported in the Table 1 to 4. The cluster
locations were labeled using the Harvard-Oxford cortical and
subcortical structural atlases [59] and by visual inspection on a
high-resolution T1-weighted image in FSL. Subregions in the
cingulate cortex were named according to Vogt’s division based on
cytoarchitectonic characteristics [60]. The results are restricted to
activations in the GM, as white matter perfusion measurements
are still challenging with ASL [56].
Results
Repeated Measures ANOVA
Significant rCBF differences for the Group main effect,
independent of Type, and for the Type main effect, independent
of Group, were found. In addition, significant perfusion differences
were observed due to an interaction effect between Group and
Type (see Table 1).
Group differences
Group differences are given in Table 2. In line with our first
hypothesis, we found positive perfusion differences in the patient
group compared to the actors (DID-SIM) and in the actors
compared to the patient group (SIM-DID).
DID showed higher perfusion than SIM in the temporal pole of
the middle temporal gyrus, in the precuneus, angular gyrus, and in
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). In SIM compared to
DID, we observed increased perfusion in the middle frontal gyrus
and the occipital fusiform gyrus.
Figure 1. Significant rCBF increases in genuine EP (DIDep) compared to genuine ANP (DIDanp) in (A) the primary somatosensory
cortex, primary motor cortex, premotor cortex and in (B) the pre-SMA and DMPFC.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098795.g001
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Table 5. Resting-state regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) differences between DID patients and non-simulating controls.
MNI coordinatesa
Brain area Side x y Z kE T value
DID-NS Middle temporal gyrus (temporal pole) L 262 6 220 187 5.82
Inferior temporal gyrus L 238 0 238 172 5.37
Superior frontal gyrus L 226 42 50 41 4.75
OFC L 26 26 218 339 4.64
Middle temporal gyrus L 270 230 210 12 4.16
DMPFC R 16 64 34 10 4.02
NS-DID Supramarginal gyrus L 258 242 44 286 6.65
Occipital pole (extrastriate cortex) L 226 298 2 515 *5.32
MPFC (frontopolar cortex) R 4 54 210 150 4.58
Angular gyrus L 252 260 30 122 4.44
Supramarginal gyrus R 62 236 44 129 4.43
Lateral occipital cortex (middle division) L 240 284 12 29 4.43
Superior temporal gyrus R 58 0 2 18 4.31
Frontal pole R 46 42 22 32 4.22
Lateral occipital cortex (superior division) L 224 276 32 39 4.15
Lateral occipital cortex (middle division) R 48 286 4 40 4.06
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) L 250 18 30 20 4.05
Insula (posterior) L 234 222 14 21 3.96
Inferior temporal gyrus R 32 232 28 13 3.71
Hippocampus R 32 232 28 13 3.71
DIDanp-NS Middle temporal gyrus (temporal pole) L 262 6 222 92 5.13
Superior frontal gyrus L 226 42 50 53 4.69
Superior temporal gyrus L 270 230 10 17 4.12
Inferior temporal gyrus (temporal pole) L 236 2 242 58 4.08
Middle temporal gyrus L 258 240 28 11 3.89
Middle frontal gyrus L 246 52 14 31 3.74
NS-DIDanp Supramarginal gyrus L 258 240 44 203 5.84
Middle frontal gyrus R 30 22 48 118 5.16
Occipital pole (extrastriate cortex) L 226 298 2 372 *4.90
MPFC (frontopolar cortex) R 4 52 28 113 4.88
Superior temporal gyrus R 58 0 2 25 4.50
Supramarginal gyrus R 64 228 34 92 4.43
Lateral occipital cortex (superior division) L 224 276 30 35 4.20
Lateral occipital cortex (inferior division) R 48 286 4 63 4.17
Middle frontal gyrus L 248 18 28 21 4.12
Frontal pole R 44 44 22 19 4.04
Angular gyrus L 242 270 46 45 4.01
Inferior temporal gyrus R 46 240 224 10 3.76
Putamen R 24 8 24 12 3.73
Hippocampus R 30 234 28 12 3.67
Occipital pole (extrastriate cortex) R 22 298 12 19 3.58
DIDep-NS Middle temporal gyrus (temporal pole) L 266 0 218 286 6.65
OFC R 6 24 226 256 4.98
Superior frontal gyrus L 226 42 50 36 4.65
DMPFC R 16 64 34 18 4.62
Superior temporal gyrus L 270 230 210 21 4.45
Inferior temporal gyrus L 262 238 224 36 4.32
Middle frontal gyrus R 54 30 36 26 3.86
Resting-State Activity in Dissociative Identity Disorder
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98795
Planned comparisons
Between-group comparisons of Type (i.e., two different types of
dissociative parts of the personality, ANP/EP) are listed in
Table 3. Type comparisons within groups are given in Table 4.
We found significant rCBF differences in all eight planned
comparisons.
Between-group Type comparisons. Significant rCBF
changes for both ANP and EP between the groups are in
accordance with our first hypothesis.
Compared to SIManp, DIDanp was associated with more
activation in the angular gyrus, temporal pole of the middle
temporal gyrus, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex (dPCC), and
precuneus (DIDanp-SIManp). In the inverse contrast (SIManp-
DIDanp), we found a higher perfusion in the middle frontal gyrus.
Increased activation in the precuneus, DMPFC, angular gyrus,
and temporal pole of the middle temporal gyrus was found in the
contrast DIDep-SIMep. In SIMep compared to DIDep (SIMep-
DIDep), we observed increased perfusion in the thalamus and in
several occipital-temporal regions (i.e., occipital fusiform gyrus,
lateral occipital cortex, temporal occipital fusiform cortex.
Within-group Type comparisons. The second hypothesis
that DIDanp and DIDep differ in resting-state perfusion could not
be rejected given significant rCBF differences in DIDanp-DIDep
and DIDep-DIDanp. In line with our third hypothesis, compar-
isons of SIManp and SIMep yielded different neural reactivity
patterns than comparisons of DIDanp and DIDep.
DIDanp had more perfusion in the bilateral thalamus than
DIDep (DIDanp-DIDep). The inverse contrast (DIDep-DIDanp)
showed increased perfusion in the primary somatosensory cortex
and in several motor-related brain areas including the primary
motor cortex and higher-order motor areas (i.e., pre-supplemen-
tary motor area (pre-SMA), premotor cortex). DMPFC hyperper-
fusion was also observed (Figure 1).
Comparing SIManp to SIMep (SIManp-SIMep) revealed
higher brain activation in the right thalamus and in the extrastriate
cortex. In the inverse contrast (SIMep-SIManp), we observed a
higher perfusion in insular-opercular regions (anterior insula,
frontal operculum) and in inferior frontal areas (pars triangularis of
the inferior frontal gyrus, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)).
Follow-Up Study
Methods
Simulating a resting DID patient is a paradoxical situation
because resting and simulating are opposite actions. Resting
instructions invite relaxed, internally directed attention, whereas
instructions to simulate a dissociative part elicit effortful goal-
directed action. This paradox did not exist in a follow-up study in
which the mentally healthy control group (NS) only received
resting instructions. The NS group consisted of 15 female
participants. There were no significant differences between the
DID and NS group in age (DID: M=43.3 years, SD=9.1; NS:
M=38.20 years, SD=10.3; t(28) = 1.428, p.0.05) and educa-
tional level (DID: M=4.1, SD=1.5; NS: M=5.1 years, SD=1.4;
t(28) =22.018, p.0.05).
Atypical default mode activity has been observed in a number of
mental disorders [61]. Only few resting-state imaging studies of
PTSD have been performed [62,63,64,65,66]. The findings are
heterogenous and are not restricted to the default mode activity,
even though abnormal resting-state activity in some areas of the
DMN was observed in PTSD patients compared to healthy
controls [62,66]. A resting-state study of DID patients is lacking to
date. As this disorder includes significant disturbances in self-
referential actions, it can be expected that DID patients and non-
simulating healthy participants differ in their default mode activity.
For the follow-up study, the data of the NS group were obtained
on the same scanner which has been used for the DID and SIM
group, but after an upgrade from the Achieva to the Ingenia
system (different MRI system). The involved system changes are
described in the Supporting Information S1 (see Text S1 in
Table 5. Cont.
MNI coordinatesa
Brain area Side x y Z kE T value
Precentral gyrus L 22 226 58 10 3.69
Superior frontal gyrus R 20 2 58 21 3.68
NS-DIDep Supramarginal gyrus L 258 242 46 301 6.69
Lateral occipital cortex (middle division) L 240 284 12 657 *5.49
Angular gyrus L 252 260 30 274 5.13
Insula (posterior) L 234 222 14 54 4.45
Supramarginal gyrus R 62 236 44 88 4.35
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) L 250 18 32 25 4.27
MPFC (frontopolar cortex) R 4 56 210 140 4.13
Frontal pole R 46 42 22 23 4.05
Inferior temporal gyrus R 46 240 222 15 4.02
Lateral occipital cortex (inferior division) R 48 286 4 32 3.90
Lateral occipital cortex (superior division) L 230 260 46 31 3.84
Hippocampus R 32 232 28 19 3.72
R/L, left or right hemisphere; kE, cluster-size in voxels (one voxel is 26262 mm); DID, patient group; NS, non-simulating control group; DIDanp, ANP DID group; DIDep,
EP DID group; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex.
aMNI coordinates (in mm) refer to the maximum of signal change in each region.
*corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster-level statistics, p#0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098795.t005
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Information S1). The data set of 15 participants of the NS group
were compared with the data set of the DID group (n= 11). For
the pre- and postprocessing of the NS data set, the same strategy
was used as for the other two groups. The following three two-
sample t-tests were performed: DID-NS, DIDanp-NS, DIDep-NS.
All three t-tests were one-sided, and were performed twice to assess
positive rCBF differences in one and in the inverse contrast.
Bonferroni corrected p-values were used (p,0.005/3=p,
0.00167) and cluster-size threshold was set at 10 voxels.
Results
DID and NS showed a different resting-state activity pattern
within the DMN (see Table 5). For DID compared to NS (DID-
NS), we observed increased activity within the left temporal gyrus
(i.e., posterior and polar part of the superior temporal gyrus,
middle temporal gyrus, and inferior temporal gyrus), OFC, and
DMPFC. Elevated rCBC in left temporal regions were also
present in DIDanp compared to NS (DIDanp-NS) and in DIDep
compared to NS (DIDep-NS). For the latter contrast, we also
found elevated perfusion in the OFC and DMPFC.
NS compared to DID (NS-DID) had increased perfusion in
posterior parietal regions (i.e., supramarginal gyrus, angular
gyrus), in several occipital areas (i.e., occipital pole, lateral
occipital cortex), in the frontal polar cortex, in the right superior
and inferior temporal gyrus, and in the hippocampus. Increased
rCBF in posterior parietal regions, occipital areas, frontal polar
regions, and hippocampus were also present for NS compared to
DIDanp (NS-DIDanp) and for NS compared to DIDep (NS-
DIDep).
Discussion
This is the first fMRI perfusion study measuring brain perfusion
following rest instructions in DID patients. As hypothesized, we
found differences between DID patients and DID simulating
actors, as well as between two different prototypes of dissociative
parts of the personality (ANP and EP) in DID patients. The follow-
up study demonstrated different perfusion patterns for DID and
controls who did not simulate ANP and EP.
Compared to actors, DID patients showed higher resting-state
metabolism in several areas belonging to the DMN (i.e, temporal
pole of the middle temporal gyrus, precuneus, angular gyrus, and
DMPFC) [32]. The default mode activity of DID is in line with
our first hypothesis and suggests that DID patients were more
involved in attending to their self-states when instructed to rest
than actors. In the inverse contrast (SIM-DID), we found more
perfusion in the middle frontal gyrus and occipital fusiform gyrus.
The DMN is also known as ’’task-negative‘‘ network [37].
Whereas it shows attenuated levels of neural activity at rest and
during self-referential processes [33,34,42,43,44,45], this network
exhibits activity decreases across many goal-directed tasks
[35,36,37,38,39,40,41]. The fact that enacting ANP and EP
involves a goal-directed task can explain the relatively lower
default mode activity for DID simulating controls compared to
DID patients.
The between-group Type effects fit to these interpretations. Of
special interest is the increased activity in the precuneus and
angular gyrus for ANP and EP in DID patients when contrasted
with the corresponding simulated ANP and EP (i.e., DIDanp-
SIManp, DIDep-SIMep). Both brain areas are part of the DMN
[33]. The precuneus is the area of the brain with the highest
resting-state perfusion and with perfusion decreases during non-
self-referential, goal-directed actions [67]. We therefore conclude
that in contrast to the DID simulating controls, DID patients
engaged as ANP and EP in self-referential mental activity in
response to resting-state instructions.
In line with our second hypothesis, we found different patterns
of resting-state perfusion for ANP and EP in the patients.
Compared to EP, ANP showed more metabolism in the bilateral
thalamus (DIDanp-DIDep), and right thalamus activity was higher
in controls simulating EP than in authentic EP (SIMep-DIDep).
However, controls simulating ANP also had more bilateral
thalamus metabolism than controls simulating EP (SIManp-
SIMep). Whereas relatively high right thalamus activity for ANP
in DID patients may not be a DID-specific finding, our result
parallels prior PTSD studies conducted under rest [68] or using
script-driven symptom provocation paradigms [26,69,70]. Lanius
et al. [26,69,70] have reported that Flashback/Reliving PTSD
patients (i.e., subjects characterized with positive dissociative/EP-
like symptoms) had not shown thalamic activation during the
recall of traumatic memories while ’’dissociated‘‘ PTSD subjects
(i.e., subjects characterized with negative dissociative/ANP-like
symptoms) did. Kim et al. [68] found a positive correlation
between right thalamic blood flow following rest instructions and
the severity of current re-experiencing symptoms in PTSD
patients. In one of the first neurobiological models of dissociation
in trauma surviviors, the thalamus was proposed to play a central
role [71]. Sensory and arousal signals parallel in the thalamus
which relays the transmission to target brain areas. Under
condition of high arousal, this transmission is altered. Kim et al.
[68] speculated that lowering of thalamic activity represents a
withdrawal of attention from external sensory stimuli which may
provoke re-experiencing symptoms. In consert with these findings,
our findings suggest that as ANP, DID patients are more open to
external sensory stimuli than as EP. Because of ANP’s habitual
tendency to be numb and depersonalized, they may not have been
that alarmed by our instructions to relax, close their eyes, and stay
immobile in a loud narrow space. As EP, however, these
instructions may have reminded them of traumatizing circum-
stances. To cope with the situation, EP may have attempted to
avoid attending to the subjectively threatening external cues,
implying low right thalamus perfusion.
However, at the same time, they may have become self-aware,
focused on internally alarming bodily and emotional cues, and
prone to reactivate painful memories. Indeed, comparing EP to
ANP in DID patients (DIDep-DIDanp), we found increased rCBF
in the primary somatosensory cortex, in several motor-related
brain areas, and in the DMPFC (see Figure 1). In a number of
independent studies, self-referential action was associated with
activity in the DMPFC [72,73,74]. Increased DMPFC activity in
DID as EP has also been observed in a previous backward masking
paradigm in reaction to potentially threatening stimuli [16]. We
suggest that in DID patients compared to ANP, EP was attending
more to his/her self-state and somatosensory sensations. Combin-
ing these findings, we interpret that focused on interoceptive,
bodily-emotional cues, as EP, the patients were highly aware of
being a body in a threatening situation. This awareness may have
triggered a tendency to engage in defense motor reactions. In line
with these findings and consistent with TSDP, DID patients
specifically reported as EP that the lack of a more explicit task to
focus on while laying in the scanner was threatening.
In line with our third hypothesis, comparisons of ANP and EP
in controls yielded different neural reactivity patterns than
comparisons of ANP and EP in DID patients. The actors reported
that they used two major strategies to fulfill their simulation task: 1)
imagining being another person and 2) trying to experience the
other person’s feelings. According to cognitive and social
neuroscience, the first strategy can be described as visual mental
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imagery [75] and the second as empathizing [76]. Visual imagery
elicits neural activity in visual areas [75,77]. The increased
perfusion in visual areas for controls simulating ANP compared to
controls enacting EP (SIManp-SIMep) suggests that as ANP,
actors particularly engaged in visual imagery. As the participants
were requested to keep their eyes closed, activation in occipital
areas cannot be explained by visual perception. The inverse
contrast (SIMep-SIManp) revealed a higher perfusion in the
anterior insula, pars triangularis of the inferior frontal gyrus,
frontal operculum, and OFC, which are known to be neural
underpinnings of empathy. There are different definitions of
empathy in the literature. The second strategy for simulating ANP
and EP mentioned above involved empathy in the sense of
‘‘Einfu¨hlen,’’ that is ‘‘feeling into someone’’ [78,79]. The anterior
anterior insula is associated with empathy for pain [80,81]. Pain
can occur beyond nociception and can be generalized to mental
suffering of any sort [82], such as laying in a scanner as a
traumatized anxious (part of a) person. The pars triangularis and
the frontal operculum are part of the mirror neuron system
(MNS). The main function of the MNS pertains to simulation. For
example, observing another person’s actions increases the firing
rate of neurons that are also active when we actually perform those
actions ourselves [83]. Thus, the MNS is involved in understand-
ing the actions and intentions of others [84,85]. Neuroimaging
studies in autism spectrum disorder patients [86] and healthy
adults [87] also suggest that the MNS plays a pivotal role in
empathy. Carr et al. [87] proposed that in concert with the
anterior insula, the MNS is involved in grasping the emotional
states of others by physically and emotionally feeling what it is like
to engage in the observed action. The OFC has been found to be
active in empathy tasks as well [88,89,90]. OFC functioning is
critical for social cognition and socially appropriate behavior.
Taken together, our data support the idea that DID-simulated
controls engaged in envisioning and feeling of what one is not, that
is, in simulating ANP and EP.
The follow-up study revealed the involvement of the temporal
lobe in DID patients compared to non-simulating controls (DID-
NS, DIDanp-NS, DIDep-NS; see Table 5) predominantly on the
left hemisphere. This finding converges with other imaging and
electrophysiological investigations of dissociation supporting the
link between dissociation and temporal lobe functioning
[46,91,92,93,94]. This association has also been proposed by a
number of studies investigating the relationship between temporal
lobe epilepsy and DID [95,96,97,98]. The temporal lobe has been
regarded as the generator of dissociative states [94,96,99]. One
explanation is that the temporal lobe has strong anatomical
connections to the limbic system (e.g., amygdala, involved in
processing emotional responses and the hippocampus, a key
structure for episodic memory) [96]. Emotional and mnemonic
functions are disturbed in trauma stressor-related disorders such as
dissociative disorders [100,101,102,103]. Dissociative parts of the
personality involve biopsychosocial subsystem that involve their
own feelings and conceptions of who they are, what the world is
like, and how they relate to that world. This selectivity could be
associated in part with temporal lobe activity. This possibility is in
accordance with a previous study showing that temporal lobe
functioning may mediate ‘‘switches’’ between dissociative parts of
the personality [104].
EP but not ANP in DID showed increased activity in the OFC
and DMPFC compared to non-simulating healthy participants
(DIDep-NS, see Table 5). Ventromedial parts of the frontal
cortex are crucial for computing the affective value of an external
sensory stimulus and for linking this perception to appropriate
guidance of behavior [105]. Previous findings suggest that the
right-sided sector of the ventromedial part of the frontal cortex, as
observed in this study, is crucial for judging and remembering the
aversive value of an external cue [106] and is sensitive to threat-
related cues [107]. The dorsal parts of the MPFC mediate the
evaluation and monitoring of negative emotions [108]. In a recent
study, EP was also associated with overactivation of the DMPFC
in response to covert trauma-related stimuli [16]. In line with
TSDP, EP’s increased DMPFC and OFC activation might be
associated with EP’s continuous tendency to mind threat and to be
fixated on threat-related cues.
In the inverse contrasts (NS-DID, NS-DIDanp, NS-DIDep; see
Table 5), non-simulating healthy individuals showed a tendency
to elevated neural activity in posterior parietal regions, the MPFC,
and hippocampus. This perfusion pattern observed for non-
simulating healthy participants resembles the one subserving scene
construction that includes a temporo-parietal-frontal network
[109,110,111]. Scene construction describes episodic simulation
or imagery of future and past events [109]. Scene construction and
default mode activity share internally directed attention [110], and
brain networks mediating future thinking and episodic memory
overlap [110,111,112,113,114]. The medial temporal lobe system,
which has long been considered to be uniquely involved in
remembering the past and which was observed in non-simulating
healthy controls as well (i.e., hippocampus), is also required to
flexibly recombine details from the past in order to simulate future
episodes [113,114,115]. The idea that non-simulating healthy
participants were mentally travelling in time is further supported
by elevated activity within the frontal polar cortex involved in
future imagery and prospective thinking [112,114,116,117], and
increased perfusion in the extrastriate visual cortex associated with
remembering past events [118].
Based on these interpretations and empirical foundations, our
follow-up study suggest that under resting instructions as ANP and
EP, DID patients activate left temporal regions more than
mentally healthy controls who do not simulate ANP and EP.
These controls may have been less involved in the task and
scanner environment allowing them to let their mind wander to
their personal past and imagined future. Of note: further analysis
suggests that these results are not explained by a time or scanner
effect (see Information S1: Text S2 in Information S1, Table
S1 in Information S1, Figure S1 in Information S1, Figure
S2 in Information S1, Text S3 in Information S1).
Merckelbach and co-workers observed a robust correlation
between alterations in consciousness, some of which may reflect
dissociative tendencies and a trait known as fantasy proneness in
mentally healthy individuals [119,120]. They argued that the
correlation between self-reports of childhood abuse and these
tendencies is mediated by fantasy proneness. Fantasy prone
individuals would mix their fantasies with real memories and
would be prone to produce pseudomemories of autobiographical
traumatic events [11,12]. Fantasy proneness is a trait defined as
the deep involvement of fantasy and imagination [121]. However,
fantasy in DID may be a means to cope with childhood
traumatization (Nijenhuis and Reinders, see Information S1 in
[14]), and DID patients are not high fantasy prone [14].
Moreover, as ANP and as EP, DID patients had less perfusion
in brain areas involved in imagination than healthy controls who
did not simulate ANP and EP in the present study. These findings
are at odds with the idea that DID involves fantasy proneness and
actual fantasizing.
The study has several limitations. First, our study may have
lacked the power to detect potential perfusion differences.
Although our sample is one of the largest samples included in an
fMRI study of DID to date, it was still relatively small. This was
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due to the difficulty finding DID patients who are able to alternate
between ANP and EP at request and to remain activated,
particularly as EP, for a substantial period of time in a challenging
fMRI environment. Further resting-state studies in DID are
needed to confirm our findings. Second, patients who can perform
these difficult actions are the ones who have been in treatment for
at least several years. Because treatment of DID fosters integration
of the different dissociative parts and traumatic memories, studies
such as ours are prone to underestimate biopsychosocial differ-
ences between these subsystems of the personality in untreated
individuals with DID. Another limitation of the study is that only
two of our patients were free of medication. Medication washout is
not feasible with DID patients. However, it is important to note
that medication does not explain the observed differences between
ANP and EP in DID. Whereas DID patients typically have
considerable comorbidity, comorbidity does not explain the
essence of the disorder, that is, the division of the personality
manifesting in dissociative symptoms. For example, significant
differences for the severity of somatoform dissociation in DID and
other mental disorders remained after statistically controlling for
the influence of comorbid symptoms [122]. Nevertheless, future
studies will need to evaluate axis I and axis II comorbidity to
disentangle dissociative symptoms and their patterns of neural
activation from comorbid symptoms. Further, although we
debriefed the presence of the identity state under investigation,
we did not obtain biophysiological information that the intended
ANP and EP were present during the measurements beyond these
parts’ self-report. Because ANP and EP had different psychophys-
iological reactions to reminders of traumatizing events [14], future
studies best also include parameters such as heart rate or
electrodermal activity. Furthermore, studies of dissociative parts
in DID and other dissociative disorders should systematically
assess their first-person experiences during the experiment. This
will allow a comparison of third-person scientific data and the
participants’ first-person, phenomenal experiences, thus bridging
the epistemic gap between body/brain and mind.
In conclusion, the present study is the first to show that two
different prototypes of dissociative parts (i.e., ANP and EP subtype
active defense) are associated with different patterns of brain
activity following rest instructions in a challenging environment.
The study also demonstrates for the first time that in this context
and in contrast to DID simulating actors, particularly but not
exclusively as EP, DID patients activated brain structures involved
in self-consciousness. Following these instructions, neural activa-
tion associated with motivated role-playing of ANP and EP by
mentally healthy controls was different from neural activation
associated with being a genuine ANP and EP. The study adds to
the evidence from supraliminal and subliminal neuroimaging
studies of ANP and EP in DID [14,15,16,21,22] that suggestion,
role-playing, and fantasy proneness do not explain the disorder.
Our results also show that dissociative parts of the personality do
not particularly activate brain structures associated with imagina-
tion. The findings are consistent with clinical observations of DID
patients and with TSDP, but inconsistent with the sociocognitive
model of DID.
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